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RENUNCIATION OF WAR 
Article 9. Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice 
and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right 
of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international 
disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, 
sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. 
The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.1
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 1.  NIHONKOKU KENPF [KENPF] [CONSTITUTION], art. 9 (Japan), available at
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html. 
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On its face, the above declaration, Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan, 
seems quixotic and vague. How can a people “forever” renounce war? Were 
there not at least some Japanese people who refused to renounce war, who 
still believed in the validity of force as a means of settling international 
disputes? How can one generation speak for and bind future generations 
with such an extreme provision? Can a people truly believe that armed 
forces or war potential will never be maintained? In light of these questions, 
which imply their answers, Article 9 would seem to have been set up for 
failure. An ideal, however noble, is still an ideal: an imagined state of 
unrealizable perfection. But what to do with an ideal that is codified in law? 
And not just any law, but the constitution itself: a document that provides 
the skeleton for all other laws? What to do, in other words, with formative 
law that is impossible to sustain? 
Politicians and other commentators have been chipping away at Article 9 
for years.2 In the wake of the American-led War in Iraq, however, Article 9 
underwent heightened and unremitting challenge.3 With the exception of 
current prime minister Naoto Kan, all of Japan’s prime ministers since the 
Iraq War—Junichiro Koizumi,4 Shinzo Abe,5 Yasuo Fukuda,6 Taro Aso,7
and Yukio Hatoyama8—have at some time called for the revision, if not the 
 2. See Kendrick F. Royer, The Demise of the World’s First Pacifist Constitution: 
Japanese Constitutional Interpretation and the Growth of Executive Power to Make War, 26 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 749, 770-97 (1993); see also Akio Sugeno, The Japanese Pacifist 
Constitution is in Danger, 64 GUILD PRAC. 184 (2007). 
 3. See generally Tomohito Shinoda, Japan’s Top-Down Policy Process to Dispatch 
the SDF to Iraq, 7 JAPANESE J. OF POL. SCI. 71, 71-91 (2006).  
 4. Koizumi Calls for Article 9 Revision, DAILY YOMIURI (Tokyo), Sept. 14, 2003, at 
1; Peter Alford, Koizumi Selects Allies to Back Military Push, WEEKEND AUSTRALIAN, Oct. 
9, 2004, at 16; Reiji Yoshida, Koizumi Urges LDP-DPJ Effort to Revise Constitution, JAPAN 
TIMES, Jan. 15, 2004, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20040115a3.html. 
 5. Abe Calls for a ‘Bold Review’ of Japanese Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, May 3,
2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/03/world/asia/03iht-japan.1.5546774.html. 
 6. Shinichi Murao & Shozo Nakayama, Debates on Constitution May Intensify,
DAILY YOMIURI (Tokyo), May 4, 2006, at 3. 
 7. Japan Says it Could Build a Nuclear Bomb, WASH. POST, Nov. 29, 2006, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/11/29/AR2006112901641.html; see also Officials Stay Calm over 
Aso’s ‘Collective Self Defense’ Remark, JAPAN TODAY, Oct. 3, 2008, 
http://www.japantoday.com/category/politics/view/officials-stay-calm-over-asos-collective-
self-defense-remark; see also Craig Martin, The Fatal Flaw in Trying to Impose a New 
Interpretation on Article 9, JAPAN TIMES, Oct. 5, 2008, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-
bin/eo20081005a2.html. 
 8. Opposition Leader Says Constitution Should Include Right to Wage War, BBC
SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS (Oct. 17, 2000), at part 3; see also Doing Battle over 
Article 9, JAPAN TIMES, May 3, 2000, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-
bin/ed20000503a1.html; see also Tetsushi Kajimoto, Hatoyama’s Proposed Amendment 
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complete overhaul, of Article 9.9 The Obama administration has fortified 
this trend in remilitarization by mounting pressure on recent Japanese 
administrations to step up the role of the Japanese military in Asian affairs.10
At the same time, the Obama administration has remained mostly 
unyielding about the maintenance of the U.S. air station known as Futenma 
on the island of Okinawa. 
This Article considers how the Obama administration’s policies toward 
Japan implicate Article 9. More specifically, it argues that the Futenma base 
dispute (as it has come to be known) jeopardizes the very existence of 
Article 9 by threatening to render it moot and by expanding the already 
expansive interpretations of Article 9. Part I provides a brief history of the 
Futenma base dispute during the Obama years, and Part II explains the 
effects of the Futenma base dispute on Article 9. More specifically, Part II 
contextualizes the Futenma issue by way of the legislative and judicial 
history of Article 9 and suggests that the intermingling of Japanese people 
and resources with the U.S. military allows Japan to circumvent Article 9 
without massive public outcry. The fact of the matter is that Japan is relying 
on American troops to perform actions (maintaining combat troops and 
weapons, conducting military exercises and operations, and establishing 
armed defensive zones) that Japan could not do on its own because of 
constitutional restraints. Japan is permitting and in some cases encouraging 
the U.S. military to carry out actions that Japan is forbidden by its 
constitution to carry out.  
One thing this article does not do is suggest that Japan should or should 
not amend Article 9. Issues of internal Japanese politics are not the concern 
of this piece; the concern of this piece is the U.S. military presence that 
threatens to undermine the constitution of a sovereign nation. A secondary 
concern is for the people of Okinawa who want the U.S. troops off their 
island. The obiter dictum of this article suggests that not just the Futenma 
air station but all U.S. forces on Okinawa should be withdrawn from the 
island not only because the U.S. military jeopardizes the import and impact 
of Article 9, but also because the people of Okinawa generally oppose the 
presence of U.S. troops in their territory. The recent court decision in Mori 
Acknowledges the SDF is a Military, JAPAN TIMES, Feb. 4, 2005, 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20050204a4.html. 
 9. Some of these calls for revision were made before these men were prime 
minister, and even, in some cases, before the Iraq War. 
 10. See Allen Mendenhall, Base Maneuvers, LIBERTY, Aug. 2010, at 11-12; Allen 
Mendenhall, Okinawa Occupied, CHRONICLES: A MAGAZINE OF AMERICAN CULTURE, Sept. 
2010, at 20-22, available at allenmendenhall.com/wp-content/uploads/Okinawa-
Occupied.pdf; Allen Mendenhall, Obama Out of Okinawa, ANTIWAR.COM (Dec. 22,  
2010), http://original.antiwar.com/mendenhall/2010/12/21/obama-out-of-okinawa/; Allen 
Mendenhall, The Latest Happy Face of the Ruling Class, COUNTERPUNCH (Dec. 27, 2010),
http://www.counterpunch.org/mendenhall12272010.html; and Allen Mendenhall, How Long 
Must Okinawans Wait, TAKI’S MAGAZINE, (Jan. 11, 2011), http://takimag.com/article/ 
how_long_must_okinawans_wait/print.  
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v. Japan provides Okinawans with a constitutional argument for challenging 
the presence of U.S. bases like Futenma. That decision established a 
concrete “right to live in peace” that, to be actionable, must bear a “legal 
relationship” to military activity that violates Article 9.   
Despite the attention that the Futenma base dispute has generated in 
Japan, relatively little scholarship in English has addressed Futenma and its 
effects upon Article 9, perhaps because the issue remains unresolved. 
Without purporting to offer a definitive resolution to this longstanding 
conflict, this Article attempts to fill that lacuna in scholarship while 
synthesizing several English-language sources on Futenma and 
contextualizing these sources within the broader meaning and history of 
Article 9. The Futenma base dispute is far from over; it is probably just 
beginning. The irony (or paradox) of the Futenma base dispute is that 
America spearheaded the pacifist provisions of Article 9 after World War II, 
but because of Futenma and other American policies in Asia, America 
might bring about the apparent violation of the very clause that it made 
possible.    
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FUTENMA BASE DISPUTE
The Futenma base dispute springs out of a long and complex relationship 
between Japan and the U.S. The U.S. military officially occupied Okinawa 
from the end of World War II until 1972.11 The decision to plant U.S. troops 
on Okinawa probably had to do with Japanese discrimination against 
Okinawans in addition to joint Japanese and American efforts to modernize 
Okinawa.12 U.S. troops have remained on the island since 1972. As of 1998, 
Okinawa hosted over half of the U.S. forces in Japan.13 At that time, U.S. 
forces took up 10% of all land on Okinawa.14 In 1995, three U.S. 
serviceman gang-raped a 12 year old girl, sparking furious protests that 
caused President Bill Clinton to express national regret over the soldiers’ 
actions.15 This event brought about an enormous rift between local 
Okinawan officials and the Japanese government over the issue of U.S. 
 11. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-98-66, OVERSEAS PRESENCE: ISSUES 
INVOLVED IN REDUCING THE IMPACT OF THE U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE ON OKINAWA 2 (1998) 
[hereinafter OVERSEAS PRESENCE]. 
 12. On this score, see Masamichi S. Inoue, We Are Okinawans But of a Different 
Kind, 45 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 85, 92 (2004). 
 13. See OVERSEAS PRESENCE, supra note 11, at 2.  
 14. Id.
 15. Mary Jordan & Kevin Sullivan, Americans Charged With Rape Turned Over to 
Police; Japanese Indictment of Three U.S. Servicemen in Okinawa Means Conviction Likely,
WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 1995, at A24; see also Op-Ed., Questions of Justice in Okinawa, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 28, 1995, § 1, at 20, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1995/10/28/opinion/ 
questions-of-justice-in-okinawa.html?src=pm; see also Kevin Sullivan, 3 Servicemen Admit 
Roles in Rape of Okinawan Girl, WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 1995, at A1. 
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forces on the island.16 This event also transformed the U.S. troops on 
Okinawa into “an element of the utmost importance in the formulation of 
the Joint Declaration on Security toward a [sic] new era.”17
After the rape incident, the U.S. and Japan established the Special Action 
Committee on Okinawa, better known by its acronym SACO. The mission 
of SACO was to “reduce the burden on the people of Okinawa and thereby 
strengthen the Japan-U.S. alliance.”18 At the behest of SACO, the U.S. and 
Japan established the Futenma accord in 1996. This agreement maintained 
that the U.S. military would return base and communications properties to 
private landowners and the prefecture, relocate helicopter landing zones, 
release Marine training areas, consolidate U.S. housing districts, terminate 
artillery live-fire training, relocate parachute drop trainings, implement 
noise reduction initiatives, and transfer Navy and other military aircrafts, 
among other things.19 The release of the agreement did not finalize specifics 
about the implementation of various provisions within the agreement 
because, as Hitoshi Tanaka, then Deputy Director-General of the North 
American Affairs Bureau (1996-98), explained, 
we have to formulate concrete ideas for the development and use of 
returned land, work out the costs involved and arrange for the required 
financial resources. Where facilities are to be relocated, we also need to 
get approval from local communities around relocation sites and then build 
the actual facilities.20
Tanaka stated quite presciently that “although we have taken the utmost 
care to select the least problematic relocation sites, criticism, particularly 
from residents around the sites, is still unavoidable.”21 Finally, he noted, 
“[i]t will be no easy task to persuade those people,” by which he meant the 
Okinawans.22 Tanaka was right to anticipate criticism. Shortly after the 
agreement was memorialized, a seemingly irritated Okinawa Governor 
Masahide Ota remarked, “[i]t’s painful to ask some areas in and out of 
 16. Okinawa Rape Case Brings Rift in Government, YOMIURI SHIMBUN (Japan), Oct. 
16, 1995, at 2. 
 17. HITOSHI TANAKA, ET AL., JAPAN-U.S. SECURITY ALLIANCE FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY: CORNERSTONE OF DEMOCRACY PEACE AND PROSPERITY FOR OUR FUTURE 
GENERATIONS 5 (1996). 
 18. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, The Special Action Committee on Okinawa 
(SACO) Final Report (Dec. 2, 1996), available at  
http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eap/japan/rpt-saco_final_961202.html.  
 19. Id. See also Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, The Japan-U.S. Special Action 
Committee (SACO) Interim Report (Apr. 15, 1996), available at
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/seco.html; see also The SACO Final 
Report on Futenma Air Station (an integral part of the SACO Final Report) (Dec. 2, 1996), 
available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/96saco2.html.  
 20. Tanaka, supra note 17, at 8. 
 21. Id.
 22. Id.
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Okinawa to bear the burden” because “Okinawans hate to see their own 
pain and agony passed to others.”23
After years of false starts, delays, and setbacks, the Futenma accord 
received renewed media attention in 2006 when the U.S. and Japanese 
governments agreed to relocate the Futenma air station to a less populated 
area near Camp Schwab in Nago (which is also on Okinawa) and gradually 
to redeploy 8,000 U.S. military personnel and their families to new facilities 
on Guam.24 The relocation was a major issue in the 2006 Okinawa 
gubernatorial campaigns that resulted in Hirokazu Nakaima’s victory.25
Nakaima had argued that the best option for Futenma would be “relocation 
outside the Okinawa Prefecture,” but he tempered that position over the 
course of his campaign by refocusing on economic and tourist initiatives 
rather than on the U.S. military.26 By 2010, when he faced and won 
reelection, Nakaima took a harder stance against the Futenma base, and at 
that time he referred to base relocation out of Okinawa as the “fast” 
option.27 The Futenma accord has since been called the “most problematic 
bilateral issue that has surfaced since the Hatoyama Cabinet was 
inaugurated.”28 Yukio Hatoyama was the Prime Minister of Japan from 
September 2009 to June 2010.  
Notwithstanding the rape incident in 1995, several key factors motivated 
the 2006 accord that called for a reduction in U.S. troops and a change in 
base geography. Reporting to the U.S. Congress in June 2010, Emma 
Chanlett-Avery, William H. Cooper, and Mark E. Manyin suggested the 
following about the goals of the accord: 
 23. Kiyotaka Shibasaki, Shift in Okinawa Base Burden Causes Opposition to Mount,
DAILY YOMIURI (Japan), Apr. 16, 1996, at 2. 
 24. See Hidemichi Katsumata, Futenma Issue Looms over Okinawa Poll, DAILY 
YOMIURI (Japan), Oct.31, 2006, at 4; see also Tatsuya Fukumoto & Takashi Imai, Document 
Seen as Alliance Road Map; Relocation Plan Hailed for Easing Hosting Burden on Okinawa 
Pref., DAILY YOMIURI (Japan), May 3, 2006, at 3; see also Okinawa Gov. OK’s Base Plan 
Inamine Expresses Broad Agreement with Futenma Shift, DAILY YOMIURI (Japan), May 12, 
2006, at 1; see also Politics must not delay Futenma relocation, DAILY YOMIURI 4
(September 4, 2006); see also Op-Ed., Futenma Relocation Agreement, JAPAN TIMES, May 
18, 2006, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/ed20060518a1.html; see also Kiroku Hanai, 
U.S.-Dependent to What End?, JAPAN TIMES, June 16, 2006, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20060626kh.html. 
 25. Takashi Oda, Political Pulse; Voters Failed to Touch Base, DAILY YOMIURI 
(Japan), Nov. 23, 2006, at 4. 
 26. Id.
 27. See Nakaima Calls Futenma Relocation Outside of Okinawa ‘Fast’ Option,
JAPAN TODAY, Dec. 28, 2010, http://www.japantoday.com/category/politics/view/nakaima-
calls-futenma-relocation-out-of-okinawa-fast-option; see also Okinawa Governor Re-elected 
in U.S. Base Dominated Poll, BBC MONITORING ASIA-PAC.–POL (Nov. 19, 2010), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-11858992.  
 28. EMMA CHANLETT-AVERY ET. AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33436, JAPAN-
U.S. RELATIONS: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 1 (2010).  
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The reduction of Marines on Okinawa seeks to quell the political 
controversy that has surrounded the presence of U.S. forces in the 
southernmost part of Japan for years. [ . . . ] Though constituting less than 
1% of Japan’s land mass, Okinawa currently hosts 65% of the total U.S. 
forces in Japan. The current controversy reflects a fundamental tension in 
the relationship between Okinawa and the central government in Tokyo: 
while the country reaps the benefit of the U.S. security guarantee, the 
Okinawans must bear the burden of hosting thousands of foreign troops. 
Although the host cities are economically dependent on the bases, 
residents’ grievances include noise, petty and occasionally violent crime, 
and environmental degradation stemming from the U.S. presence.29
I quote at length because the authors make several important points. Part of 
what makes the Okinawa issue so complicated, the authors seem to suggest, 
is the Tokyo-Washington alliance. Elsewhere I have proposed that this 
Tokyo-Washington alliance is like governmental collusion that has 
effectively disenfranchised Okinawans, who do not have the political clout 
or muscle to challenge a single massive central government, let alone two 
such governments.30 In saying this, I have echoed the criticisms of others. 
Glenn D. Hook and Richard Siddle explain, for example, that for Japan, 
“the ‘Okinawa problem’ is one to be solved through economic blackmail or 
heavy-handed political tactics.”31 These commentators point to “the 
continued use by the Japanese state of economic carrot-and-stick methods to 
placate Okinawans over the bases.”32 The use of these methods indicates “a 
profound lack of imagination among Japan’s political leadership and an 
unwillingness to let localities practise any meaningful form of autonomy.”33
Because the island of Okinawa is culturally, ethnically, and historically 
distinct from Japan proper, and because Okinawans continue to have their 
interests slighted or suppressed by the Japanese government in Tokyo, 
experts like Doug Bandow have remarked that the Tokyo-Washington 
alliance smacks of collusion and colonialism.34 Others have likewise called 
 29. Id. at 7. 
 30. See Mendenhall, Okinawa Occupied, supra note 10, at 20; see also Allen 
Mendenhall, Don’t Forget Okinawa, THEMENDENHALL.COM (Mar. 4, 2011),
http://themendenhall.com/2011/03/04/dont-forget-okinawa/. Asian historian and political 
activist Chalmers Johnston also refers to the Washington-Tokyo relationship as “collusion.” 
CHALMERS JOHNSTON, BLOWBACK: THE COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICAN EMPIRE 57 
(Henry Holt & Co. 2004) (2000). 
 31. JAPAN AND OKINAWA: STRUCTURE AND SUBJECTIVITY 244 (Glenn D. Hook & 
Richard Siddle eds., 2003). 
 32. Id.
 33. Id.
 34. See Doug Bandow, Freeing Okinawa, KOREA HERALD, May 18, 1999 available 
at http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=5127; see also Doug Bandow, Okinawa and 
the Problem of Empire, HUFFINGTON POST (March 25, 2010, 2:59 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/doug-bandow/okinawa-and-the-
problems_b_512610.html?bandow/okinawa-and-the-problems_b_512610.html? (“Today 
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Okinawa a “dumping ground”35 for U.S. bases and have suggested that 
Okinawans are treated as “second class” citizens in Japan.36
The Tokyo-Washington alliance was temporarily unsettled when the 
leaders of the U.S. and Japan took on new faces and personalities, first in 
Obama, who was elected in 2008, and then in Hatoyama, who was elected 
in 2009. Under Hatoyama’s leadership, the Democratic Party of Japan 
(DPJ) gained power over the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which had 
more or less enjoyed political supremacy for the last 60 years. The election 
results bothered Washington and the Obama administration because the 
both U.S. and Japanese government officials cheerfully conspire against Okinawans.”); see 
also DOUG BANDOW, FOREIGN FOLLIES: AMERICA’S NEW GLOBAL EMPIRE 141 (2006) 
(“Washington and Tokyo continued to collude against the island.”). For further reading on 
Okinawa and colonialism, see Darrell Y. Hamamoto, ‘Soft Colonialism’: A Nikkei 
Perspective on Contemporary Okinawa, 3 OKINAWAN J. OF AM. STUD. 28 (2006) (describing 
the various incarnations of soft colonialism still present in Okinawa). 
 35. Andrew Daisuke Stewart, Kayano v. Hokkaido Expropriation Committee 
Revisited: Recognition of Ryukyuans as a Cultural Minority Under the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, An Alternative Paradigm for Okinawan 
Demilitarization, 4 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 382, 384 (2003) (“Okinawa, Japan’s poorest 
and one of its smallest prefectures, has been a dumping ground for American bases since the 
end of World War II.”). 
 36. Post-war history reveals that Japan has consistently used Okinawa as a valuable 
bargaining chip in its dealings with the United States. Over the past fifty years, Japan has 
wagered the Okinawan people’s lives, lands, and future, in negotiating the terms of 
surrender, independence, and reversion. This strategy has succeeded in minimizing the 
number of U.S. bases in Japan and has kept its main islands free of nuclear weapons. The 
popular perception—the scenario that the Japanese government would most likely desire to 
perpetuate—is that Okinawa’s condition has been the result of a vanquished country being 
forced to acquiesce to the demands of a victorious foreign power. On the contrary, Japan has 
not been merely a passive bystander, but a willing participant in the process of designing 
Okinawa’s fate. While the Allies provided Japan with a level of self-determination in shaping 
its future, neither the United States nor Japan has ever consulted the Okinawan people or 
given them a voice as to what should become of them and their homeland. Little or nothing 
has been done so far to address or alleviate Okinawa’s numerous problems that stem from 
the excess proliferation of U.S. bases. Even the recent steps that have been taken through the 
formation of SACO have not brought about a difference in the everyday living conditions of 
the island’s inhabitants. 
It has been over a century since Okinawa was a Japanese colony and the Japanese 
government no longer officially designates Okinawa’s inhabitants as second-class citizens. 
Today, the people of Okinawa are citizens of the Japanese nation-state, legally entitled to the 
same protection and privileges as all other Japanese. In reality, however, the hierarchical 
power structure that has defined the relationship between the Wajin and the Ryukuans is still 
firmly in place. Whether it was the feudal era policy to separate and distinguish Ryukuans 
from the Wajin, or the Meiji government’s attempts to eliminate all traces of Ryukuan 
culture, Japan has always determined Okinawa’s path. It is in this historical framework that 
people must view the current ‘Okinawa Problem.’ The fact that a disproportionate share of 
U.S. bases in Japan are located in Okinawa is due to the Japanese government’s view of the 
Okinawan people as “different,” and the current situation builds upon the historical treatment 
rooted in this perception. Notwithstanding the government’s official position of impartiality 
and equality with regard to Okinawa, the base situation in Okinawa is nothing but partial and 
unequal. Id. at 428-29. 
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defiant Hatoyama seemed unwilling to toe the Washington policy line.37
Obama officials met with Japanese leaders on December 4, 2009 to express 
concern about Hatoyama’s policies, but the meeting was a failure.38
Japanese and American officials used the meeting to wrangle over the 2006 
accord.39 The particularly divisive issue at that meeting was not the accord 
generally but more specifically the role of the Futenma air base40 that had 
sparked recent protests by Okinawans, who preferred that the base be 
moved completely out of Okinawa, and possibly out of Japan.41
Comments by U.S. Ambassador John Roos, who claimed that the Obama 
administration expected Japan to resolve the base dispute “expeditiously,”42
set the stage for an argumentative meeting, as did similar comments by 
Defense Secretary Robert Gates, who, in a visit to Japan in October of that 
year,43 lectured his Japanese hosts.44 Gates informed his hosts, for instance, 
that the U.S. would not transfer 8,000 troops from Okinawa to Guam and 
would not surrender parcels of land belonging to Okinawans if Japan 
refused to honor the 2006 accord.45 Gates’s aggressive attitude toward the 
Japanese earned him the nickname “Grumpy Gates.”46
Meanwhile, Hatoyama triggered media attention for his response to 
Gates’s call for expedition: “We are not discussing this on the premise that 
it has to be decided by the end of the year.”47 Hatoyama had other political 
difficulties brewing at this time, especially with his party struggling to 
 37. See John Pomfret, U.S. Concerned About New Japanese Premier Hatoyama, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 29, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/12/28/AR2009122802271.html?hpid=topnews; see also John 
Pomfret & Blaine Harden, U.S. Struggles to Keep Step with Japan’s Shifting Foreign Policy,
WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 2009 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ 
article/2009/12/04/AR2009120401033.html.  
 38. Pomfret & Harden, supra note 37 (“The meeting ended with no apparent 
agreement.”). 
 39. Id.
 40. See Eric Talmadge, Futenma Dispute Strains Ties with Japan, AIR FORCE TIMES,
Dec. 29, 2009, http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2009/12/ap_japan_futenma_122909/; see 
also Pomfret & Harden, supra note 37.  
 41. Isabel Reynolds, Thousands of Japanese Protest U.S. Base Plan, REUTERS, Nov. 
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adjust to its new leadership responsibilities.48 In fact, the problems facing 
Hatoyama were so intense that DPJ leaders worried about losing their 
majority in the upper house.49 One Tokyo-based analyst announced with 
apparent sarcasm “Hatoyama thinks the United States should be kind 
enough to wait on the base issue until this political problem is solved.”50
The Japanese were not the only ones frustrated with the stalemate over the 
base issue or the Obama administration’s heavy-handedness in dealing with 
Hatoyama. Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Nye took to 
the pages of The New York Times to complain that “we need a more patient 
and strategic approach to Japan. We are allowing a second-order issue to 
threaten our long-term strategy for East Asia.”51
Despite this increasing attention to the Futenma base dispute, the Obama 
administration continued to pressure Hatoyama and the Japanese leadership 
even as Hillary Clinton met with Japanese leaders to try to defuse the 
tension.52 The Obama administration, for its part, struggled to make sense of 
the messages that Hatoyama was sending about Futenma. Foreign Minister 
Katsuya Okada at one point told the Japanese media that the Hatoyama 
administration was suspending talks about the Futenma base relocation,53
and then, a few weeks later, Hatoyama informed Obama that he (Hatoyama) 
had postponed his decision about Futenma until 2010.54 Resolution of the 
Futenma base dispute was put off until 2011 (although at this writing 
resolution has yet to materialize). 
Rather than moving towards Obama’s stated interests in 2010, Hatoyama 
moved away from them, going so far as to announce that the Japanese navy 
would no longer support the U.S.-led Afghan War.55 In discussions with 
Japanese Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada in Hawaii,56 Hillary Clinton tried 
to alleviate the situation by talking about the longstanding “U.S.-Japanese 
 48. Id.
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alliance”57 and the need for “stability for the region.”58 Clinton’s measured 
vocabulary and cautious rhetoric recast the Futenma base dispute to portray 
American interests as compatible with Japanese interests and as protective 
of Japan. “It is much bigger than any one particular issue,” she announced.59
After U.S. Senators Daniel Inouye (D-Hawaii) and Thad Cochran (R-
Mississippi) met with Hatoyama in January 2010, the two countries 
reasserted their commitment to one another and downplayed the gravity of 
the Futenma dispute.60 If this event signaled progress, then Clinton’s claims 
shortly thereafter that the U.S. would “exercise influence”61 in Asia for the 
next 100 years—to say nothing of the strangeness of this prophesy—
signaled a serious setback. Commenting on the ongoing feud between the 
Obama and Hatoyama administrations, Gavan McCormack, emeritus 
professor at Australian National University and coordinator of The Asia-
Pacific Journal, used words like “paternalistic,” “colonial,” “anti-
democratic,” and “intolerant” to refer to U.S. policy.62 He mocked Obama’s 
campaign slogan by applying it to the situation in Okinawa: “Yes we can—
but you can’t.”63 Chalmers Johnson put it even more strongly: 
The U.S. has become obsessed with maintaining our empire of military 
bases, which we cannot afford and which an increasing number of so-
called host countries no longer want. I would strongly suggest that the 
United States climb off its high horse, move the Futenma Marines back to 
a base in the United States (such as Camp Pendleton, near where I live) 
and thank the Okinawans for their 65 years of forbearance.64
In April 2010, Japanese public support for Hatoyama sank to below 
30%;65 the Futenma base dispute was a key factor in the poll. During the 
same month, a Tokunoshima-based group collected 24,000 signatures for a 
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petition opposed to the transfer of U.S. facilities to the island.66 If those 
numbers can be considered representative, then 80% of Tokunoshima 
residents opposed hosting the U.S. base on their island.67 It is not surprising, 
then, that Okinawans were upset by the DPJ stance on Futenma. 
Three mayors on the island of Tokunoshima rejected the DPJ appeal to 
host the base, citing concerns about noise and security.68 They drafted a 
letter to Obama in which they protested against the Futenma base 
relocation,69 and they scheduled a rally to make abundantly clear the extent 
of their opposition to Futenma.70 One mayor, Akira Okubo, said that he 
would send photos of the rally to the American president.71 Another mayor, 
Susumu Inamine, staged a sit-in at the Diet in Tokyo.72
Hatoyama’s stance did not translate into political success. He became 
more controversial among Japanese and Americans alike even as his 
resistance to Obama began to bring about results in the form of U.S. 
concessions, such as the returning of three significant sites to Japan: the 
bombing ranges on two nearby islands (Kumejima and Torishima) and the 
water area east of Okinawa.73 At the same time, media outlets began 
challenging the widely accepted notion that U.S. Marines were 
indispensible to the safety of the region.74 In the face of these seeming 
victories for Hatoyama, Obama undertook a publicity campaign of his own, 
questioning whether he could “trust” Hatoyama to “follow through,” a 
comment that sounded more like a challenge than a regret.75 One 
commentator called Obama’s remarks “extraordinarily harsh.”76 At any rate, 
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neither Obama nor Hatoyama seemed to gain political leverage on the issue 
of Futenma. The base was simply too controversial.  
Polls released on April 19 showed that more than half of Japanese voters 
wanted Hatoyama to step down if he could not resolve the base issue.77 On 
April 20, Hatoyama’s administration tried but failed to set up meetings with 
the three mayors on Tokunoshima;78 the mayors gave the administration the 
cold shoulder. Despite the resistance in Tokunoshima, Hatoyama reiterated 
his pledge to resolve the base dispute by the end of May,79 and 
Tokunoshima remained the Japanese government’s favorite option for the 
relocation.80 The U.S., however, rejected the proposal to relocate to 
Tokunishima.81
Katsuya Okada, then Minister for Foreign Affairs, allegedly presented 
John Roos with a proposal on April 23 that some read82 as a broad 
acceptance of the 2006 accord. Yet the proposal did not totally conform to 
U.S. designs. It called for altering a new runway in the town of Henoko, for 
instance, and for transferring parts of the Marine facility away from 
Okinawa.83 The Washington Post broke the story of these supposed 
concessions. But Okada’s proposal may not have existed. Just a day after 
The Washington Post story, Media Monitors Network (MMN) questioned 
the credibility of the Okada account,84 which Hatoyama himself denied 
outright. MMN’s Gordon Arnaut railed against The Washington Post: “It 
boggles the mind that a flagship U.S. newspaper could get a major story so 
wrong. Not just off by a little bit, but exactly opposite to the actual truth. 
And timed, cynically, to coincide with a huge demonstration against the 
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base.”85 The disputed article from The Washington Post is no longer 
available online.  
Ohisa, one of the three mayors on Tokunoshima, informed Hatoyama 
that he (Hatoyama) was not welcome to visit Tokunoshima.86 Despite this 
remark, Hatoyama met with all three of the dissenting mayors, who, rather 
than capitulating, handed Hatoyama their petition signed by residents 
opposed to the Futenma base.87 Protestors numbering 5,000 marched while 
the three mayors took their stand against Hatoyama.88 The mayors’ refusal 
to consent to Hatoyama’s requests put Hatoyama in the position of having 
to go forward with the base plans despite the wishes of Tokunoshima 
residents, to leave the base where it was on Okinawa, or to split the base 
into two parts: one on Tokunoshima and one where it already existed on 
Okinawa.    
On May 8, six DPJ lawmakers traveled to Saipan, part of the Northern 
Mariana Islands, a U.S. territory, as a last-ditch effort to relocate the 
Futenma base entirely outside of their country.89 American leaders in Saipan 
had expressed interest in hosting the U.S. troops, but Obama has remained 
silent about this option.90 During the lawmakers’ trip, reports by Japanese 
news agencies suggested that Hatoyama would make his final decision in 
two days.91 “We are putting the finishing touches to a government proposal 
right now,” Hatoyama said.92 In light of the foregoing, the six Japanese 
lawmakers probably intended their Saipan visit to make a symbolic point 
about America’s insistence on occupying foreign territory despite the fact 
that a relatively nearby U.S. territory was a viable option for base 
relocation.  
On May 17, Okinawans, in their own attempt at symbolism, formed a 
17,000 person chain around the U.S. Marine air base.93 The chain was eight 
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miles long.94 On May 23, Hatoyama issued his final decision: the 2006 
provisions of the Futenma accord would remain in effect. Obama got his 
way. Hatoyama resigned shortly thereafter—just eight months after taking 
office. Despite Obama’s victory, the Futenma base dispute has not been 
settled. By the time this article goes to print, there will have been several 
updates on the Futenma base dispute during the tenure of the Kan 
administration. I doubt that the dispute will have been resolved. Only time 
will tell how the story of Futenma will end.  
II. EFFECTS OF THE FUTENMA BASE DISPUTE ON ARTICLE 9
Emma Chanlett-Avery says that “[a]lthough the current DPJ government 
has officially endorsed the plan to build the replacement facility in Nago, 
local opposition remains strong and the central government has limited 
political capital to push forward with implementation.”95 Like I, Avery 
seems to believe that the future of Futenma remains unclear. One point, 
however, is clear: unless U.S. bases like Futenma are removed from 
Japanese territory altogether, they will undermine the authority of Article 9 
and force Japanese politicians to cut away at the already endangered 
principle of constitutional pacifism. That is because the Futenma accord 
pushes the limits of circumscribed military power and directly and 
proximately moves Japan in the direction of remilitarization: directly
because the intermingling of Japanese people and resources with active U.S. 
military facilities allows the Japanese government to rely on another 
military to carry out activities that would implicate Article 9 if done by the 
Japanese, and proximately because the U.S. has pressured Japan to enhance 
her military size and prowess as a condition for minimizing the U.S. 
military presence in the country. Part II is organized to address first the 
recent militarization trends implicating Article 9, and second the Futenma 
base dispute that seems to have emanated from those trends.   
After the atomic bombings, the U.S., in the person of General Douglas 
MacArthur, and the Japanese, in the person of Prime Minister Kijuro 
Shidehara, constructed Article 9.96 These two leaders were instrumental to 
the passage of this provision. They met and discussed the proposed 
constitution at length; they remained mostly cordial.97 MacArthur shared 
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classified documents with Shidehara, expressed concern over the future role 
and office of the emperor, and gave the impression that he (MacArthur) 
understood the best interests of the Japanese and was willing to distance 
himself from positions held by the Allies.98 On one position, though, 
MacArthur was unwavering: “Japan must respect the views of foreign 
countries” when it came to renouncing war because a “constitutional 
provision permitting military forces and armaments would convince other 
countries that Japan was determined to rearm.”99
The legislative history of Article 9 is extensive and arguably hazy,100 but 
it suggests that the role of U.S. officials was dispositive to the promulgation 
of Article 9 because “the United States had to show the world that Japanese 
militarism would never revive and Japan would never be a threat to others, 
to Asia in particular.”101 Article 9 first appeared as one of two provisions 
outlined in General MacArthur’s notes before it became the hallmark of the 
Japanese constitution by explicitly renouncing the use and maintenance of 
Japanese military forces;102 the clause forbids Japan from resorting to war to 
resolve foreign conflict (see the epigraph above). According to Okubo 
Shiro, Article 9 originally appeared in the preamble and only later got 
transferred to the body of the document.103 During deliberations over the 
prospective constitution, Japanese conservatives agreed to the provisions of 
Article 9 in exchange for the preservation of the tenno system, which was a 
hierarchical ruling tradition that held up the emperor as the ultimate and 
symbolic head of the nation.104 The original meaning of Article 9 “was 
clearly intended to be a flat denial of every kind of war and of any 
development of war potential in Japan in order to prevent the possibility of 
Japanese aggression in Asia and elsewhere.”105 This meaning is based on the 
plain language of the article and agreed upon by “most mainstream Japanese 
constitutional law scholars.”106 Concerns about the breakdown of Article 9 
and the expansion of Japanese war powers have been on the rise for several 
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years—indeed, it was not until the Cold War that Japan began to interpret 
Article 9 as allowing self-defense forces107—but such concerns gained 
traction during the Gulf War in the early 1990s.108
Although in 1990 Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu proposed a bill to allow 
Japanese Self Defense Forces (SDF) to participate in U.N. peacekeeping 
activities, the bill was overwhelmingly rejected by Japanese politicians and 
the Japanese people.109 The Gulf War, however, demonstrated that Japan 
could get around Article 9 while sending civil service members and 
eventually the SDF to the Persian Gulf,110 even if Japan refused to partake in 
that war as a coalition member. Part of the reason that Japan joined with 
Western powers had to do with its obligation to the greater U.N. 
community.111 The U.N. Charter requires member nations, as a condition of 
membership, to “accept the obligations contained in the present Charter” 
and to be “able and willing to carry out these obligations,”112 including, if 
necessary, the compliance of member states with U.N. requests for armed 
assistance in international conflicts.113 This U.N. mission and similar 
activities have made the “self-defense” mantras of the SDF seem 
misleading. Because of the apparent contradiction between SDF activities 
and the meaning of the signifier “self-defense,” one author has accused 
Japan of engaging “in semantic contortions to downplay its military 
capabilities and activities.”114
In 1997, the U.S. and Japan renegotiated their military roles for the 
region in and around Asia. The two countries established guidelines that 
marked “not only an increased level of defense burden sharing for Japan, 
but also a move toward taking greater responsibility for its own defense.”115
The guidelines called specifically for Japanese cooperation in Asian 
conflicts, search and rescue or evacuation assistance, battlefield rear area 
support, and actual implementation of the guidelines.116 Some scholars 
considered the constitutionality of the guidelines vis-à-vis the three 
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branches of government (judicial, executive, and legislative) that have 
interpreted Article 9 in different ways.117 Even scholars could not reach 
definitive conclusions and could not offer clear or immutable policies as 
tests for constitutional validity.  
The guidelines appear to have passed constitutional muster, but only by 
way of a liberal reading of Article 9. As one commentator put it, “Japan’s 
current situation is not consistent with the wholehearted renunciation of war 
reflected in Article 9” because the SDF, “consisting of the Ground Self 
Defense Forces, the Maritime Self Defense Forces, and the Air Self Defense 
Forces, has one of the largest budgets in the world, and its navy has more 
destroyer-sized warships than the British Navy.”118 This commentator also 
notes that “Japan’s preeminent economic status,” coupled with its “reliance 
on a stable world situation to maintain that status,” makes Japan an ideal 
military partner for other countries, which increasingly have pressured 
Japanese administrations and the Japanese Diet to relax their interpretations 
of Article 9.119 Ultimately and practically, these guidelines represented only 
a minor escalation of Japan’s military role,120 but such escalation “eroded” 
Article 9 and “further opened the door to Japanese rearmament.”121 All of 
this happened long after the U.S. had already precipitated the “destruction 
of the ideological motivations of Article 9.”122   
Some have suggested that Japan has already violated Article 9—if not 
by maintaining SDF forces, then by deploying special envoys to assist U.S. 
efforts in Afghanistan,123 dispatching naval troops to the Indian Ocean,124 or 
aiding the U.S. in the construction of a missile defense system.125
Traditionally, though, Japanese interpretations of Article 9 have not 
engaged in what American jurisprudents might refer to as “textualism” or 
 117. See Fisher, supra note 116 at 418-21. 
 118. Matthew J. Gilley, Japan’s Developing Military Potential within the Context of 
its Constitutional Renunciation of War, 14 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1681, 1684 (2000). 
 119. Id. at 1684. 
 120. Ajemian, supra note 115, at 350. 
 121. Michael Panton, Japan’s Article 9: Rule of Law v. Flexible Interpretation, 24 
TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 129, 141 (2010). 
 122. Id.
 123. Japan Appoints Special Envoy to Afghanistan, Pakistan, BBC MONITORING ASIA 
PAC—POL. (Mar. 1, 2009), available at LEXIS, BBC Monitoring: Int’l Rep., Asian Pac. 
Stories. 
 124. See also Takeo Kumagai, Japan Extends Naval Presence in Indian Ocean, 86 
PLATTS OILGRAM NEWS, Dec. 15, 2008, at 2; see also Japan Ruling Parties Approve 
Extending Iraq, Indian Ocean Missions, BBC MONITORING ASIA PAC.—POL. (June 10, 2008) 
available at LEXIS, BBC Monitoring: Int’l Rep.—Asian Pac. Stories (stating Japan extended 
refueling support in the Indian Ocean to help with the reconstruction and antiterrorism 
mission). 
 125. See also China warns US, Japan Against Pushing Missile Defence System, THE 
INDEPENDENT, Sept. 24, 1998; see also Russia Concerned at Japan’s Plans to Deploy Missile 
Defence System, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS (Dec. 24, 2002), available at
LEXIS, BBC Monitoring: International Rep.—Asian Pac. Stories. 
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“originalism” as qualified and formalist mechanisms for understanding 
constitutional meaning. Japan’s approach has been, for want of a better 
word, more pragmatic.126 The question of whether Japan has violated Article 
9 has not turned on the reduction of that provision to definite and fixed 
principles. Nevertheless, Japanese interpretation has transformed Article 9 
into what at least one legal analyst has called a paradox:  
The paradox of Article 9 is evident when comparing the aspirational 
language and the reality of Japan’s military forces. The divergence 
originated at the onset of the Korean War, and grew dramatically during 
the Cold War as the SDF continued to evolve in terms of capabilities and 
numbers. The rapid growth soon made plain that Article 9 is irreconcilable 
in its present form with the realities of today.127
As the following representative cases in Part II (Subsection A) will 
show, Japanese courts have dealt with Article 9 mostly in the domestic 
sphere and have remained generally deferential to legislative action.128
Matthew J. Gilley casts some light on this judicial penchant: “When a 
domestic decision is involved, Japanese courts operate under a high 
presumption that the government’s action is valid. Rights claimed by 
individuals under Article 9 . . . do not limit the government’s conduct in 
these domestic contexts. Instead, the courts’ standard seeks to avoid these 
questions of constitutionality and directs them to the political arena for 
resolution.”129 The result is that powers of interpretation have been left in 
the hands of the electorate and polity that use public opinion to mobilize 
politicians in one direction or another regarding Article 9.130 Post-9/11 
events and political agendas concerning terrorism and national security, 
however, took some of this power back out of the hands of the electorate or 
polity and arguably transferred that power into the hands of the American 
executive and legislative branches that have continued to pressure Japanese 
politicians into compliance with American foreign policy interests.  
 126. For a reading of Article 9 from an originalist-like perspective, see Kenneth L. 
Port, Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution and the Rule of Law, 13 CARDOZO J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 127 (2005). 
 127. Michael A. Panton, Politics, Practice, and Pacifism: Revising Article 9 of the 
Japanese Constitution, 11 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 163, 178 (2010). 
 128. Id. at 1693-1703. See also Edward J.L Southgate, From Japan to Afghanistan: 
The U.S.-Japan Joint Security Relationship, the War on Terror, and the Ignominious End of 
the Pacifist State?, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1599, 1624 (2003) (“In contrast to the U.S. Supreme 
Court—activist or otherwise—the Japanese Supreme Court has pursued a policy of extreme 
deference to the legislature in exercising judicial review.”) (internal footnote omitted).  
 129. Gilley, supra note 118, at 1703. 
 130. Id.
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A. Judicial History of Article 9 
Japanese courts have addressed Article 9 repeatedly. A few decisions 
bear mentioning because they serve as illustrative examples of how 
Japanese courts analyze and ultimately rule on Article 9 cases. These cases 
demonstrate the deference that Japanese courts usually allow the political 
branches regarding Article 9. These cases also raise jurisprudential 
questions about legality. For instance, if a constitution explicitly forbids a 
thing from happening, but allows that thing to happen in practice, does the 
constitutional ban have any constructive effect at all, or is the ban purely 
symbolic? If a constitution forbids the wearing of green, but a legislature 
takes actions that cause or enable people to wear green, and the courts rule 
that the legislature has acted properly, is the ban on wearing green a law or 
an ideal? Given the same hypothetical, what if the people wear just touches 
of green, or colors of off-green or almost green, and the legislature endorses 
those outfits despite the constitutional ban on green—would that make the 
wearing of green still illegal? The point is that the strict and plain language 
of Article 9 forbids, without exception, the use and maintenance of Japanese 
military force and arms, but an expansive legislative interpretation of force, 
given credence by Japanese courts, which have refused to revise or overturn 
these legislative interpretations, has led to a situation in which Article 9 
means whatever the legislature says it means—which is to say that it means 
nothing or anything at all. As Carl F. Goodman puts it:  
However one views the terms of Article 9, it appears clear that what you 
get is something other than what at first glance—and perhaps even after 
searing examination—you see. This seeming contradiction between terms 
and actual practice is a reflection of a more general approach to 
constitutional interpretation in Japan.131
From the following cases, it seems apparent that Article 9 does not serve its 
intended function to eliminate the military activities in and of Japan; nor is 
Article 9 void of all purpose or utility, however, because it continues to 
constrain Japanese foreign policy by forcing Japanese leaders to “get 
around” Article 9.     
1. Sakata v. Japan, or “The Sunakawa Case” (1959) 
The Sunakawa case was the first judicial attempt to determine the 
constitutionality of certain activities vis-à-vis Article 9. The case arose 
when the defendants (or appellants) were prosecuted for trespassing on an 
 131. CARL F. GOODMAN, 2 THE RULE OF LAW IN JAPAN: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
235 (2008). 
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American military base in Sunakawa.132 The defendants argued that the very 
existence of the American base offended Article 9.133 Judge Akio Date, 
Judge Shunzo Shimizu, and Assistant Judge Ichiro Matsumoto handed 
down the decision, which reasoned principally that Japan could pursue 
military activity for self-defense purposes.134 Put another way, the court 
sidestepped the issue of the SDF’s legitimacy and instead authorized 
Japan’s abstract right to self-defense. The case inaugurated not only a 
precedent for upholding a Japanese right to self-defense, but also a 
precedent for judicial equivocating about Article 9, particularly with regard 
to the SDF. Such equivocation has come to be known as the “doctrine of 
avoidance.”135
2. The Naganuma Nike Missile Site Cases (1973) 
The Naganuma Nike Missile Site Cases refer to litigation initiated by 
Hokkaido residents against the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries and carried out at multiple levels of appeal.136 Naganuma I 
appeared before the Sapporo District Court, Naganuma II before the 
Sapporo High Court, and Naganuma III before the Supreme Court of Japan. 
The residents challenged the construction of a base site in Naganuma that 
would require the transfer, flooding, and damage of forest lands.137 The 
residents also challenged the constitutionality of the SDF. The District 
Court held that the SDF was unconstitutional because the SDF constituted 
an “armed force.”138 In addition, the District Court invalidated the land 
transfer because, according to the court, the transfer did not serve the public 
interest.139 On appeal, the Sapporo High Court reversed the District Court 
decision, which the Supreme Court of Japan affirmed on the grounds that 
the residents lacked standing to bring suit.140 The residents were deemed to 
have had no standing because they did not suffer direct harm.141 The 
constructive effect of the case was to narrow the class of people who could 
bring suit under Article 9.  
 132. SaikG Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 16, 1959, 1959(A) No. 710, 13 SAIKF
SAIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHH [KEISHH] 3225 (Japan). 
 133. Id.
 134. Id.
 135. Panton, supra note 127, at 212. 
 136. [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 9, 1982, 36 SAIKF SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHH [MINSHH] 1679 
(Japan), translated in LAWRENCE W. BEER & HIROSHI ITOH, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW 
OF JAPAN, 1970 THROUGH 1990 122-23 (1996) [hereinafter Uno v. Minister of Agric., 
Forestry & Fisheries]. 
 137. See id.
 138. Id.
 139. Id.
 140. Id. at 129. 
 141. Id.
104 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 20:1
3. Ishizuka et al. v. Japan e. al., or “The Hyakuri Air Base  
  Case” (1989) 
The Hyakuri Air Base Case involved a plot of land that the SDF sought 
to purchase to facilitate the construction of a military base.142 The Court in 
this case extended the doctrine of avoidance.143 Reasoning that under Article 
9 the use of force for self-defense purposes was constitutional, the Mito 
District Court found for the SDF and used the political question doctrine to 
avoid formative resolutions about the constitutionality of the SDF.144 The 
Tokyo High Court affirmed this decision without clarifying the role of the 
SDF vis-à-vis Article 9. This case demonstrates that the doctrine of 
avoidance has become a hallmark of judicial practice regarding Article 9 
and also that the political question doctrine repeatedly has offered other 
branches of government wide latitude to carry out projects related to self-
defense and the SDF.  
4. Mori v. Japan (2008) 
In Mori v. Japan, over 5,700 appellants and 800 attorneys challenged 
their country’s deployment of the SDF to the Middle East during the Iraq 
War.145 In 2003, during the height of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, Japan 
contributed not only SDF personnel but also three transport aircrafts for 
mobilizing troops and supplies.146 The appellants argued that Japan’s 
involvement in Iraq violated their right to “live in peace.”147 They claimed 
that Article 9 granted them such a right.148 For remedies, appellants sought 
an “injunction against the deployment, a confirmation that the deployment 
was unconstitutional, and ¥10,000 each (approx. US$100) in damages.”149
Appellants contended that the right to live in peace was actionable; the 
government contended that such a right was merely abstract and therefore 
that appellants lacked standing.150 The Nagoya District Court ruled in favor 
of the government, and the Nagoya High Court affirmed.151 In effect, the 
principle handed down from this decision was that the right to live in peace 
 142. SaikG Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] June 20, 1989, 43 SAIKF SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHH
[MINSHH] 6, 385 (Japan) translated in Lawrence W. BEER & HIROSHI ITOH, THE CASE LAW OF 
JAPAN, 1970 THROUGH 1990 132 (1996) [hereinafter Ishizuka v. Japan].  
 143. See Panton, supra note 127, at 213. 
 144. Ishizuka v. Japan, supra note 142, at 131. 
 145. See Mori v. Japan: The Nagoya High Court Recognizes the Right to Live in 
Peace, 19 PAC. RIM. L. & POL’Y J. 549 (2010) (Hudson Hamilton trans.). 
 146. Id.
 147. Id.
 148. Id.
 149. Mori v. Japan, supra note 145, at 549-50. 
 150. Id. at 550. 
 151. Id.
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exists but was not implicated on these facts.152 This holding means that 
elements of the SDF forces were unconstitutional but that remedies were not 
available to these plaintiffs. The court reasoned that the “integration of the 
SDF’s air transport activities with the use of force by coalition forces in an 
international military conflict constituted the use of force by the SDF in 
violation of Article 9.”153
The Nagoya High Court’s decision was never appealed, so it remains 
binding in Nagoya and persuasive precedent elsewhere in Japan to the 
extent that it is not overruled. The court appears to have enunciated a 
standard couched in language about a “right to live in peace,” which “can be 
called a compound right that can be expressed as a freedom right, a social 
right, or a political right, depending on the circumstances.”154 The right to 
live in peace is a new human right in Japan.155 To invoke this right in a court 
of law, plaintiffs must demonstrate a “legal relationship” between the right 
and the military activity that violates Article 9.156 Okinawans could cite the 
“right to live in peace” standard and the Mori case to challenge the 
constitutionality of Futenma and other bases on Okinawa. Finding 
Okinawan plaintiffs who have suffered direct harm from the bases should 
not be difficult. Moreover, courts could interpret the Japanese support of, 
and financial contributions to, U.S. bases on Okinawa as reaching an 
actionable level of Japanese integration with military activities that use 
force.    
Unlike the three cases discussed earlier, Mori v. Japan suggests that 
Japanese courts will not always defer to other branches of government on 
matters pertaining to self-defense and the SDF. Courts usually defer to such 
branches by invoking the political question doctrine or by limiting standing 
to plaintiffs who suffered actual harm (the Mori court claimed that the 
plaintiffs could not establish a “legal relationship” between their right to 
live in peace and the war activities in question). These two elements—the 
political question doctrine and actual harm—together make up the 
cornerstone of the “doctrine of avoidance” whereby Japanese courts shy 
away from definitive conclusions about Article 9. Even though the plaintiffs 
were not eligible for a remedy in Mori v. Japan, Okinawans could rely on 
the decision in Mori to seek a constitutional remedy. Okinawans would 
have to cite the court’s standard about a “right to live in peace” and 
demonstrate how that right bears a “legal relationship” to the military 
activities taking place in and around Okinawa.    
 152. Id.
153. Id. (This language comes from a summary of the translation.). 
 154. Mori v. Japan, supra note 145, at 561. 
 155. Id. at 550. 
 156. Id. at 561. 
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B. Japan and Military Activity 
Since 9/11, Japan has stepped up her military role on a global scale. The 
Japanese Diet passed the Antiterrorism Special Measures Law in 2001,157 a 
measure that muddled the already confused commitment that Japan owed to 
both the U.N. and her national Constitution.158 The Antiterrorism Special 
Measures Law lapsed in 2007, but it lead to a similar successor law, and its 
effect was once again to water down the explicit terms of Article 9 and to 
categorically commit Japan to U.S. political and military interests abroad. 
According to the law, Japan could offer security forces in the Iraq War, but 
in principle it could do so only if the forces were limited to humanitarian 
assistance.159 Despite the apparent meaning of the law, “it is suspected that 
in reality the SDF performed war-participation acts that could be construed 
as cooperation in prosecuting the war.”160 Indeed, the law threatened the 
viability and credibility of Article 9 more than any statutory measure, 
political scheme, or partisan event up to that point. Scholars of the Japanese 
constitution have described the law in the following way: 
The intent [of the law] is to conduct “cooperation and support activities” 
including supply, repairs, servicing, medical care, and the transport of 
weapons, ammunition, and personnel, but assuming that the use of force is 
impossible without such help, this support is an essential part of military 
action, and is therefore clearly participation in war. This would be the first 
participation in the use of force by Japan’s military apparatus in the 
postwar years, and would clearly violate Article 9 of Japan’s 
Constitution.161
In spite of such objections by scholars and activists, Japan reaffirmed the 
contributory role of the SDF in 2003 with passage of the Anti-Terrorism 
Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq. 
 157. Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, Terotaisaku Tokubetsu Sochi Hô, Law 
No. 113 of 2001, available at http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/2001/anti-
terrorism/1029terohougaiyou_e.html (in English). 
 158. For more on this dilemma, see Craig Martin, Japan’s Antiterrorism Special 
Measures Law and Confusion over U.N. Authority, JAPAN TIMES, Oct. 8, 2007, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20071008a2.html. 
 159. See id.
 160. Kenji Urata, The Universal Spirit of the Japanese Constitution: Re-Reading 
Article 9, 3 PEACE & CONFLICT REV. 1, 2 (2008). 
 161. See Southgate, supra note 128, at 1604 (citing An Urgent Appeal from Japan’s 
Constitutional Scholars, JAPAN COMPUTER ACCESS (Oct. 9, 2011), 
http://www.jca.apc.org/~kenpoweb/appeal_eng.html) (doubting the constitutionality of the 
Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law). 
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This law was “highly specific and strictly limited in purposes and duties” 
and aimed to “implement the measures of assistance in Iraq.”162
Scholars have labored to contextualize, synthesize, and assess the 
judicial holdings and political debates concerning the Anti-Terrorism 
Special Measures law in relation to Article 9.163 In brief, the law has not 
been interpreted as violating the Japanese Constitution because of the law’s 
specifications against the use of force or combat, as well as its precautionary 
stipulation entitled “Use of Weapons,” which allows the SDF to use 
weapons but only in expressly limited instances.164 According to this 
stipulation, the SDF would not be able to engage in a hostage rescue 
operation in Iraq since that might entail combat and thus exceed the scope 
and reach of Article 9.165 In this sense, Article 9 constrained the activities of 
the legislative and executive branches even though the judiciary has 
deferred judgments about Article 9 to those branches.  
The plain language of Article 9, however, is explicit about banning 
military troops and activity, and the reformulated role of the SDF flies in the 
face of the plain language of Article 9. Edward J. L. Southgate put it well 
when he said, “The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law invests the SDF 
with the responsibility of carrying Japan’s burden of collective self-defense. 
Although the law was carefully tailored by the Koizumi cabinet to avoid 
deviation from Article 9, the reality is that the expanded operational 
abilities, both geographic and military, materially diverge from the spirit of 
the ‘no war’ clause.”166 It is clear, then, that whatever Article 9 signifies 
today, it is more than just the plain meaning of the plain language. 
Literalists or formalists might argue that with a historically significant and 
sensitive provision like Article 9, there is no meaning outside the plain 
language of the provision. By this logic, Japan has invalidated Article 9 
already because of its actions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Indian Ocean, 
and especially because of its role in engineering a missile defense system in 
conjunction with the U.S. But Japan has not taken a literalist or formalist 
approach to interpreting Article 9.  
Many Japanese politicians and citizens have called for not only 
reinterpreting but also revising Article 9 so that Japan can maintain fidelity 
to the constitution as well as investment in SDF activities abroad. “There 
appears to be a consensus among segments of Japanese society,” explains 
Mark A. Chinen,  
 162. Mika Hayashi, The Japanese Law Concerning the Special Measure on 
Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq: Translator’s Introduction, 13 PAC.
RIM L. & POL’Y J. 579, 581 (2004). 
 163. See, e.g., Southgate, supra note 128 at 1619-33. 
 164. Hayashi, The supra note 162, at 582 (translating the Law concerning the Special 
Measures in Iraq, Art. 2, ¶ 2, among other provisions). 
 165. Id. at 583. 
 166. Southgate, supra note 128, at 1633. 
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that a confluence of trends—Japan’s emergence as an economic power, its 
greater participation in Pacific and world affairs, its aspiration to a more 
important role in the United Nations, the severe criticism it received when 
it did not participate directly in the Persian Gulf War, pressures from the 
United States to expand its security relationship by putting SDF personnel 
in harm’s way, developments on the Korean peninsula, the emergence of 
China as an economic and military force, and 9/11—could well require 
Japan to take steps that, if it wishes to remain true to a constitutional form 
of government, might involve far more than just a reinterpretation of 
Article 9.167
But so far Japan has not revised Article 9. If anything, Japan has taken steps 
that suggest that Article 9 is an ideal, not a practical reality that substantial 
revision would definitely impact. Besides her commitment of troops for 
humanitarian purposes in Iraq, for instance, Japan has dispatched envoys to 
Afghanistan to aid the U.S. War efforts there,168 pledged to help the U.S 
develop a missile defense system,169 deployed forces to the Indian Ocean,170
and, with the exception of prominent individuals like Hatoyama, 
 167. Chinen, supra note 107, at 65. 
 168. Japan to Send Envoy to Take Part in US Review of Afghan Strategy, BBC
MONITORING ASIA PAC.—POL. (Feb. 25, 2009); see also Japan Envoys to Meet USA’s 
Holbrooke on Afghanistan 9 March, BBC MONITORING ASIA PAC.—POL. (Mar. 6, 2009),
available at LEXIS, BBC Monitoring: Int’l Rep.—Asian Pac. Stories (noting Japan’s envoys 
to Afghanistan meet with U.S. representatives to show support for the United States’ military 
shift to Afghanistan). 
 169. Calvin Sims, U.S. and Japan Agree to Joint Research on Missile Defense, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 17, 1999, at A4; see also Calvin Sims, U.S., Japan Join Forces on Missile 
Defence System, GAZETTE (Montreal), Aug. 17, 1999, at B1; see also Protecting Japan—
Part IV; Missile Defense to Cost 30 Tril. Yen, DAILY YOMIURI (Japan), Sept. 25, 2004, at 4; 
see also North Korean Institute Denounces US, Japan Theatre Missile Defence Plans, BBC
MONITORING ASIA PAC.—POL. (Mar. 8, 1999), available at Factiva, Doc. No. 
bbcapp0020010901dv3800nph; see also Russian Defence Chief Restates Criticism of Japan-
US Missile Defence Plans, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Asia-Pacific (Nov. 29, 
2000), at part 3; see also Japan to work on missile defenses, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Aug. 17, 
1999, at 1A. 
 170. See Howard W. French, Threats and Responses: Japan’s Role; U.S. Applauds 
Tokyo’s Dispatch of Warship to the Indian Ocean, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2002, at A22, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/10/world/threats-responses-japan-s-role-us-
applauds-tokyo-s-dispatch-warship-indian-ocean.html?src=pm; Japan to Dispatch Three 
MSDF Vessels to Indian Ocean, XINHUA (China), Nov. 8, 2001; see also Japan Dispatches 
Another Warship to Indian Ocean to Assist US Mission, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD 
BROADCASTS (Nov. 26, 2004) available at LEXIS, BBC Monitoring: Int’l Rep.—Asian Pac. 
Stories (stating Japan has dispatched four Marine Self-Defense Force Aegis warships to the 
Indian Ocean to support U.S. operations); see also P. S. Suryanarayana, Japan to Extend 
Anti-Terror Mission in Indian Ocean, HINDU (Chennai), Apr. 24, 2005, 
http://www.hindu.com/2005/04/24/stories/2005042401730900.htm; see also Japan to Extend 
Forces Indian Ocean Support Operations, BBC MONITORING ASIA PAC.—POL. (Apr. 13, 
2005); see also Japan Extends Missions in Iraq, Indian Ocean Until 2009, BBC MONITORING 
ASIA PAC.—POL. (June 13, 2008), available at LEXIS, BBC Monitoring: Int’l Rep.—Asian 
Pac. Stories. 
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encouraged and sustained the maintenance of U.S bases on Okinawa. Japan 
supports these bases insofar as Japanese citizens work on and fund the 
bases. In effect, the bases allow Japan to rely on the U.S. military to do what 
Japan is forbidden to do by Article 9. The most important of these 
developments, for the purposes of this paper, is of course the Futenma base 
dispute, which represents an intermingling of Japanese and U.S. military 
powers at the expense of a small group of islanders.   
C. Intermingling of Japanese People and Resources with the U.S. 
Military 
Chinen underscores the critical role that the U.S. has played in diluting 
Article 9 of its constructive meaning. That role is magnified in the case of 
Futenma because Japan pays large sums of money to support this base and 
allows Japanese citizens to work on the base. For example, the Japanese 
government “used the politics of compensation as [a] strategy to pacify 
strong anti-base opposition,”171 and to that end it “allocated 7.5 billion yen 
to each local district hosting U.S. military bases,”172 distributed large 
endowments “to communities that accepted bases slated for relocation 
within Okinawa,”173 and “offered 100 billion yen over a seven-year period 
for projects proposed under the Informal Council on Okinawa 
Municipalities Hosting U.S. bases.”174 Add to these numbers the fact that 
Okinawans work menial jobs on the base175 and Futenma begins to look like 
an operation of the Japanese as much as of the U.S. In short, the American 
Futenma base and other American bases and troops on Okinawa offer the 
Japanese government a loophole to avoid violating Article 9. That is 
because Japan supports the bases almost as if they were its own, and the 
bases purportedly exist to service the interests of the Japanese as much as 
the interests of Americans.  
Japan has combined its interests with American military interests by 
sharing in the funding of U.S. military bases, subsidizing certain military 
base activities, discouraging Okinawan demonstrations against the military 
bases, and incentivizing the maintenance of military bases in local 
communities—in part because these bases play a role that the SDF cannot 
play without clearly violating Article 9. In effect, the Futenma base and 
bases like it remilitarize Japan notwithstanding that these bases belong to 
Americans and that Japanese workers on the bases do not participate in 
 171. ANDREW YEO, ACTIVISTS, ALLIANCES, AND ANTI-U.S. BASE PROTESTS 83 (2011). 
 172. Id.
 173. Id.
 174. Id. at 83-84. 
 175. See, e.g., Futenma Divides Okinawa’s Expats, JAPAN TIMES, June 8, 2010, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/fl20100608zg.html (statement of interviewee) (“I still 
want Futenma though, because there are a lot of people still working there. Not just Filipinos 
but Okinawans too who’d lose their jobs in the restaurants and movie theaters if it closed.”). 
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active combat. This impression is made stronger by the fact that the 
Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Forces (MSDF) have begun to cooperate 
with U.S. forces on and around the bases—so much so that “U.S. Navy 
officials have claimed that they have a closer daily relationship with the 
MSDF than with any other navy in the world, with over 100 joint exercises 
annually.”176
It is not necessarily the case that, by itself, a U.S. base in Japan 
constitutes the exercise of war powers in violation of Article 9; it is that 
Futenma and other bases on Okinawa are supported by Japan, both 
financially and rhetorically, and that every year the number of Japanese 
citizens employed by the bases seems to increase.177 Japan of course does 
not exert control over the bases the way the U.S. executive and upper-level 
U.S. military officials do. But, Japan has heavily influenced policy 
regarding the U.S. bases, which could not exist without Japanese support. 
As Part I of this article demonstrated, Japanese politicians and officials such 
as Hatoyama can have an enormous impact on U.S. foreign policy in 
general and the U.S. bases on Okinawa in particular. Part of the reason is 
that without Japanese political and financial support, the U.S. bases on 
Okinawa probably would not remain solvent or viable.178 Japan does not 
 176. EMMA CHANLETT-AVERY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33740, THE U.S.-JAPAN 
ALLIANCE 12 (2011). 
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facilities under the Japan [sic] under the Japan Facilities 
Improvement Program, vicinity improvements, and relocation 
construction and other costs. 
U.S. Gov’t Accounting Office, GAO/NSIAD-98-66, Overseas Presence: Issues Involved in 
Reducing the Impact of the U.S. 16 (1998). 
 178. I say this in light of America’s mounting debt crisis, economic downturn, and 
financial crisis, as well as the sheer costs of maintaining the bases that America would bear if 
Japan and the Okinawans did not already bear it. On this last point about America bearing 
the costs of the bases, consider the following:  
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The overall U.S.-Japan security relationship requires a U.S. basing 
presence. U.S.-Japanese defense relations are governed by a uniquely 
one-sided security treaty and also by Japan’s postwar constitution 
(put into place under heavy U.S. pressure and guidance) that 
prohibits Japan from creating a military organization with offensive 
capabilities. While provisions of the pacifist Article 9 of the Japanese 
constitution have been reinterpreted over time to allow Japan to 
create well-armed self-defense forces, Japan still relies on the United 
States to come to its defense, while maintaining that it is 
constitutionally prohibited from returning this favor for the United 
States or for American allies like South Korea. Consequently, the 
United States provides Japan with a security guarantee, and in return, 
the Japanese state contributes over 57 percent of the annual direct 
stationing costs of the United States Forces Japan (USFJ). This 
means that Japan is an inexpensive place for U.S. bases to be located. 
Second, the nature of the political relationship that governs the U.S. 
bases in Okinawa is trilateral, as opposed to bilateral. The United 
States, the Japanese mainland government, and the Okinawa 
prefectural government constitute three distinct actors, each with 
separate identifiable interests. The quid pro quo arrangements in 
other U.S. basing cases are usually bilateral, between Washington 
and the host government. Here, in contrast, the key compensatory 
relationship is not between Washington and Okinawa, but between 
Tokyo and Okinawa. The Japanese government effectively 
externalizes the permanent U.S. military presence on its territory by 
foisting it onto Okinawa, which provides 75 percent of the territory 
for USFJ installations despite being only one of forty-seven Japanese 
prefectures (and despite having an overall land mass only about the 
size of metropolitan Tokyo). The main Okinawan island hosts thirty-
eight major installations covering 23,500 hectares, or about 18 
percent of Okinawa’s land mass. All four U.S military services—
including the huge facilities of the Third Marine Expeditionary Force 
and the Kadena Air Force Base—are represented on the island. The 
number of U.S. military personnel on the island at any one time is 
about 25,000 (around a quarter of the entire U.S. presence in Asia), 
and the combination of their dependents and U.S. civilian contractors 
brings the total American defense-related presence up to 50,000. 
Compounding this sense of bearing an unfair basing burden, 
Okinawa remains relatively underdeveloped compared with 
mainland Japan. Its per capita income is about 75 percent of the 
Japanese average, making it the least wealthy Japanese prefecture. 
In exchange for asking Okinawa to bear this ‘special’ or ‘unequal’ 
burden, the Japanese central government offers public works projects 
and budget subsidies to Okinawa’s prefectural and municipal 
governments and selective incentives to certain of Okinawa’s 
economic sectors. Taken together, these economic payoffs are 
sufficient to sustain Okinawan acquiescence for the U.S. military 
presence.  
Alexander Cooley & Kimberly Martin, Base Motives: The Political Economy of Okinawa’s 
Antimilitarism, 32 ARMED FORCES & SOC’Y 566, 571-72 (2006) (explaining in much further 
detail additional financial incentives and burdens borne by Japan and Okinawa).  
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control the U.S. bases, but itsaffects them in decisive ways and even keeps 
them operational with her financial support. Quantifying its degree of 
control over the bases is difficult and, in light of confidential military 
information, arguably impossible for the “outside” or nonmilitary observer. 
But it is safe to say that Japan’s efforts make bases like Futenma more 
sustainable than they would be if only America provided their support and 
resources.   
To preemptively counteract criticisms about the Japanese role in 
sustaining U.S. bases, or about American occupation of Okinawa in the face 
of widespread and longstanding local resistance to U.S. bases, American 
leaders, including Obama, have pushed Japanese leaders to expand Japan’s 
military role in international affairs.179 It is as if these American leaders 
have urged Japanese leaders to offend or discard Article 9 so that America 
can stop offending Article 9 on Japan’s behalf. One wonders how the U.S. 
bases on Okinawa would stand up to judicial scrutiny because Okinawans 
seem to be a narrow enough class to have standing to sue under Article 9, 
and because the U.S. bases do not make up the SDF but instead rely on 
Japanese money, people, and resources to sustain themselves.180 An Article 
9 suit might allow Okinawans to circumvent some U.S.-Japanese 
agreements that have prevented Okinawans from exercising jurisdiction 
over certain criminal actions occurring in their territory or from litigating 
matters against the U.S. military.181 Although most suits under Article 9 
have yet to yield positive results for those seeking a strict and rigid 
 179. See, e.g., Gavan McCormack, Deception and Diplomacy: The US, Japan, and 
Okinawa, 9 ASIA-PAC. J. 21 (2011), available at http://japanfocus.org/-Gavan-
McCormack/3532; see also Gavan McCormack, Japan, through the US looking glass, ASIA 
TIMES ONLINE, June 26, 2008, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/JF26Dh01.html; see also
Gavan McCormack, Remilitarizing Japan, 29 NEW LEFT REV., Sept.-Oct. 2004, at 29, 
available at http://www.newleftreview.org/?view=2525. 
 180. The issue would seem to turn on sovereignty itself insofar as the issue would 
implicate Article 9 of the Constitution vis-à-vis Japan’s duty to the U.S. under treaties, etc. 
See Toni M. Bugni, The Continued Invasion, 21 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 85, 110-11 
(1997): “Although Japanese and U.S. officials need to recognize these problems [of 
Okinawan safety and resistance to U.S. bases] and work toward implementing feasible 
solutions to the problems caused by the bases on the island, the United States is legally able 
to continue holding its bases on Okinawa. Under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and 
Security, the United States has the right to station troops in Japan; Japan has the duty to 
provide land for U.S. military facilities. This agreement has not lapsed but has been updated 
and reaffirmed several times since its initial signing. Both countries recognize the validity of 
the treaty and its related agreements.” The issue is whether the treaty itself offends Article 9 
and, if so, which authority trumps the other, or alternatively the issue might be redefined if 
the U.S. military is intermingled with the Japanese government and citizenry. Some of these 
questions might be resolved by courts if Okinawans were to bring suit under Article 9. 
 181. See, e.g., Hiroshi Fukurai, People’s Panels vs. Imperial Hegemony: Japan’s 
Twin Lay Systems and the Future of American Military Bases in Japan, 12 ASIAN-PAC. L. &
POL’Y J. 95, 117-23 (2010). See also Ian Roberts McConnel, A Re-examination of the 
United-States-Japan Status of Forces Agreement, 29 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 165 (2006) 
(discussing the U.S.-Japan Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)). 
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interpretation of the article’s plain language, Mori v. Japan seems to have 
provided Okinawans with a plausible basis for bringing suit on the grounds 
that they have “a right to live in peace” that bears a direct legal relationship 
to the harm they have suffered from Japanese support of military activities.      
If Japan wants to amend Article 9, that is Japan’s business. America 
should not play a dispositive role in the process. If the Japanese leadership 
wants American troops to remain in Japan, as some individuals and groups 
frequently have claimed,182 then the American military and American 
leaders should take pains to disclaim any determinative influence in the 
textual adaptation or nullification of Article 9. Revising or adapting Article 
9 probably will not resolve the problems of Futenma or benefit Japan in the 
long-term; a “policy of constitutional transformation will upset the balance 
of power within Japan’s government and tarnish Japan’s legitimacy as a 
constitutional democracy,” and the “expansion of Japan’s military 
operations outside of its borders facilitated by a policy of constitutional 
transformation will further deteriorate Japan’s already tenuous relations 
with neighboring states.”183 This claim assumes that Japanese courts will 
persist in their deference to the Diet and that serious revision to Article 9 
would send a threatening message to other Asian countries.   
Okinawans should look to Mori v. Japan at least to gain political 
leverage. America should withdraw its troops from Okinawa so that Japan 
can decide the fate of Article 9 for herself. At this rate, the likely demise of 
Article 9 will be blamed on the U.S. military and U.S. leadership, and it 
may be too late to convince anyone otherwise. But by withdrawing U.S. 
troops from Okinawa, America can at least ensure that it does not finally 
decide the outcome of Article 9 for the Japanese, even if it will have played 
a causative role in draining Article 9 of meaning and practical import. The 
death of Article 9 would signify much more than the failure of one 
country’s unique and noble legal experiment; it would signify the failure of 
allegedly universal principles—jus ad bellum—to prove useful or practical 
as opposed to merely abstract and speculative.184 The impending death of 
 182. See, e.g., Japan Wants U.S. Marine Base to Stay on Okinawa,
ASIANCORRESPONDENT.COM (Oct. 23, 2009), http://asiancorrespondent.com/21557/japan-
wants-us-marine-base-to-stay-on-okinawa/. 
 183. David McArthur, Constitutional Transformation and its Implications for 
Japanese Pacifist Democracy, 7 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 197, 198 (2009). 
 184. For context on this point, Craig Martin argues:  
[I]f this account is accurate, that is, if it can be shown that Article 9 
was designed to implement principles of jus ad bellum as a pre-
commitment device to prevent the use of force, and that those 
principles successfully operated to later constrain government policy 
with respect to the use of force, then the Japanese experience 
provides evidence that it is feasible to use constitutional design for 
the purposes of incorporating and implementing in the domestic legal 
system the international law norms on the use of armed force.  
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Article 9 will mean that similar articles and provisions will be unlikely to 
appear in the future constitutions of other countries.     
CONCLUSION
Some have argued that the bases on Okinawa obstruct economic growth 
on the island:  
[T]he U.S. bases in Okinawa impede economic development of the 
prefecture. U.S. military bases comprise 20% of the land area of 
Okinawa[;] consequently, they obstruct plans for roads and industrial 
development. Furthermore, although the United States agreed to return the 
wharves at Naha to Okinawan control twenty-three years ago, the U.S. 
Army still controls them. The Okinawans would like to transform those 
docks for commercial use to help bolster the local economy; they remain 
empty, however, except for the one military vessel that docks there once a 
month.185
On the other hand, many observers, including Alexander Cooley and 
Kimberly Zisk Martin, argue that the Okinawa bases boost the local 
economy, provide thousands of local jobs, keep small businesses afloat, and 
spawn rent payments and public works money.186 If Cooley and Martin 
mean that Okinawa generates more revenue with the U.S. military presence 
than without, then they are probably right. But no one can say for sure. The 
problem with hypothetical statistics is that they are hypothetical. Perhaps 
tourism would have been stronger in Okinawa without U.S. soldiers running 
around. Or perhaps Japan could have found a better use for the island. At 
the end of the day, all we have is conjecture. What we can say with some 
degree of certainty is that feelings about the base are mixed, both on and off 
the island, both in Japan and in America, and that other viable alternatives 
to Okinawa are available, as evidenced by an unanimous vote187 in the 
Senate of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands to welcome 
the U.S. Marines currently stationed in Japan. One wonders why Obama 
will not transfer the Futenma troops and base to Tinian, an island that wants 
Craig Martin, Binding the Dogs of War: Japan and the Constitutionalizing of Jus 
Ad Bellum, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 267, 268 (2008). 
 185. Bugni, supra note 180, at 97-98. 
 186. Alexander Cooley & Kimberly Zisk Marten, Lessons of Okinawa, N.Y. TIMES,
July 30, 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/30/opinion/30ZISK.html?pagewanted=1. 
 187. David Allen, Tinian Island Makes a Push to Host Futenma Operations, STARS 
AND STRIPES (Apr. 21, 2010),  
http://www.stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=69453. 
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the troops and base,188 rather than forcing the troops and base upon a 
population that, with a few notable exceptions, despises the American 
military.  
Lieutenant General Terry Robling, who commands the U.S. Marine 
bases in Japan, has a different argument for the presence of the U.S. military 
in Okinawa: “We provide the Japanese government with a credible 
deterrence force—a highly effective, highly trained and very mobile force 
that is very strategically located.”189 Robling adds that “the stability of the 
region has been caused by our presence here. Over 50 years now there’s 
been relative peace in the Asia region.”190 The problem with this argument 
is that it is analogous to claiming that a lack of new terror attacks on U.S. 
soil is evidence that George W. Bush’s anti-terror policies worked; the 
problem, in other words, is that there is no evidence—or, rather, that the 
evidence is in the absence of evidence. Ultimately, there is no proof. Not 
only is there no proof, but there is no way of knowing what might have been 
if circumstances were different—if Japan instead of the U.S. had maintained 
control over Okinawa.  
Robling might be correct. The U.S. probably deterred some conflict. To 
what extent, however, is unquantifiable. Also unquantifiable is the amount 
of harm that the U.S. military presence caused over time. Even if the U.S. 
military has made Japan safer from outside forces, it has endangered many 
people on the island. According to Defense Ministry data, U.S. military 
personnel were responsible for 7,277 accidents and criminal cases dating 
back five years from March 2009.191 Of these, 6,180 occurred while U.S. 
personnel were off-duty.192 Furthermore, the U.S. presence may have 
triggered a resurgence in nationalism among countries like North Korea or 
China that have unstable relations with Japan. These countries have good 
reason to be skeptical of the nearby U.S. military. The point, in any event, is 
that because we cannot know what Japan would have been like without U.S. 
forces on Okinawa, we cannot say that Japan is better or worse off because 
of Americans. True, there are no easy answers to the Futenma base 
dispute,193 but the most reasonable solution—the one that would please 
Okinawans and would have pleased the Hatoyama administration—is to 
withdraw American troops from Okinawa. Whether Okinawans bring suit 
 188. Haidee V. Eugenio, House Relocation Urges U.S., Japan to Consider Tinian as 
Futenma Relocation Site, SAIPAN TRIBUNE (Northern Mariana Islands), May 3, 2010, 
http://www.saipantribune.com/newsstory.aspx?newsID=99294&cat=1. 
 189. Alastair Leithead, No Easy Answers in Okinawa, BBC NEWS (Mar. 30, 2010, 
15:05GMT), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8574208.stm. 
 190. Id.
 191. Bad Memories of U.S. Bases Linger, JAPAN TIMES, Apr. 29, 2010, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20100429f1.html.  
 192. Id.
 193. Leithead, supra note 187. 
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under the premises established in Mori v. Japan is outside the control of 
American leaders and activists. But troop withdrawal is another matter.  
Only by U.S. troop withdrawal will Japan be left to decide for herself 
whether the provisions of Article 9 remain viable in the rapidly developing 
and globalized world. Only by U.S. troop withdrawal will Japan retain her 
complete sovereignty and Okinawa her regional integrity. Only by total U.S. 
troop withdrawal, finally, will Okinawans be afforded the opportunity to 
produce a sustainable infrastructure and to shift resources to more socially 
and culturally beneficial uses. The Futenma base dispute has left Okinawa 
in a state of fear and uncertainty. That is not fair to Okinawans. That is not 
diplomacy. That is something else. What, exactly, is difficult to say. 
